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NATIONAL IDS IN A GLOBAL WORLD: SURVEILLANCE, SECURITY,
AND CITIZENSHIP
David Lyon*
New IDs, proliferating around the world, portend a new social and political
condition. Not merely a response to post 9/11 anxieties about national secu-
rity, new IDs are a novel means of governance in a world where surveil-
lance is the dominant organizational mode. Showing a token of legitimate
ID is now a basic condition for the exercise of freedom. Now that IDs de-
pend on large-scale databases, biometrics, and sometimes RFID, what does
the "new social and political condition" mean for surveillance, security and
citizenship?
I. INTRODUCTION
The first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed a veritable
explosion of new national ID card initiatives all over the world. They ap-
peared without fanfare, as in Belgium, or with sustained controversy, as in
Britain.' They are being installed in vast nations such as India and China
and much smaller ones such as Mongolia or Angola.2 Rich countries and
poor ones, global north and global south, democratic and otherwise, with
previous histories of carrying IDs or not-all kinds of countries are doing
the same thing or at least a similar thing. The idea of having a biometric ID
card associated with a national registry database has quickly been globa-
lized, although how many national schemes actually take off remains to be
seen. Ironically, though, many of the devices being globalized are a means
of maintaining national identities.
Such ironies deserve exploration, not least because they have a
bearing on three (or more) crucial issues in today's world: surveillance,
security, and citizenship. However they are introduced, national IDs involve
surveillance. It is not merely that tabs may be kept on populations. Those
"tabs" introduce new levels of visibility of citizens such that the state may
"see" them so much better.3 As surveillance has now become the privileged
* Director, the Surveillance Studies Centre, Queen's Research Chair in Surveillance Stu-
dies and Professor of Sociology, Queen's University, Canada.
1 DAVID LYON, IDENTIFYING CITIZENS: ID CARDS AS SURVEILLANCE 58 (2009).
2 See generally id.
3 See generally JAMES C. Scoar, SEEING LIKE A STATE (1999).
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
mode of many organizations,4 this is highly significant. Closely related to
this idea of surveillance is security that now has to do not only with interna-
tional relations, but also with urban security and crime. This connects with
risk assessments and "prudentialism" that marks a shift from preoccupation
with the past to focus on the future. Prevention and pre-emption of crime
are now of the essence on national and international fronts.5 Both preven-
tion and pre-emption of crime tie in with citizenship, a concept that is also
undergoing radical change in the early twenty-first century. National identi-
fication by definition affects citizenship. But will this be for the better or for
the worse-or both? The answer, as we shall see, really depends on which
country or region we are talking about. The very concept of citizenship
means different things in different countries.
On the one hand, the global growth of national ID systems is strik-
ing. Often, these ID systems are interoperable-most incorporate biome-
trics 6 and some also add radio frequency identification (RFID). 7 Large in-
ternational corporations compete for procurements and may support ID sys-
tems in quite different locations (LaserCard supplies systems in Angola and
Italy, and the Canadian Permanent Resident card, for example). 8 The soft-
ware have some similar protocols, which means that ID systems have simi-
lar features wherever they are found. Together, these factors mean that
much more than "the state" is involved in IDs. IDs are the product of gov-
ernment departments, but also of business practices, through outsourcing,
and technological development which, once directed towards certain ends,
becomes in a sense "self-augmenting." 9 The assemblage of technologies
sets up a framework within which future developments occur. The combina-
tion of "production factors" of new IDs may helpfully be thought of as a
"card cartel" which, once established, defines and limits the market for such
systems. 1
On the other hand, while the new IDs have much in common as
computerized systems that enhance surveillance capacities-both govern-
ment and, sometimes, corporate-these IDs also display different faces in
4 See Kevin D. Haggerty, 'Ten Thousand Times Larger... ': Anticipating the Expansion
of Surveillance, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN SURVEILLANCE AND PRIVACY 159 (Benjamin Goold &
Daniel Neyland eds., 2009); DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW (2007).
5 See LUCIA ZEDNER, SECURITY (2009).
6 See, e.g., LYON, supra note 1, at 117.
7 Id. at96.
8 See, e.g, id. at 63, 52, 66.
9 See JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (1964).
10 LYON, supra note 1, at 63.
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different settings." Chameleon-like, new IDs appear in their local environ-
ments in subtly varying guises. The local life of new IDs depends on histor-
ical circumstances, political traditions, and cultural differences. Indeed,
without exaggeration, IDs may be viewed along a continuum that ranges
from democratic documents to tools of tyranny. Marginalized people such
as Tibetans in Nepal, or workers suffering abuse in Argentina, seek registra-
tion and identification documents as a basic human right. Would-be travel-
ers from Ghana hope that their new IDs will help them avoid the humilia-
tions of border crossings. On the other hand, in contexts of intense surveil-
lance, such as in South Korea or the U.K., there are fears that new IDs may
result in a "Big Brother" state.' 2 And beyond individual states, groups such
as the European Association for the Defense of Human Rights fear that civil
liberties will be trampled as interoperable ID systems are deployed within
the EU.
These themes are explored in what follows: new IDs, their global
growth, and their local life are examined in relation to surveillance, security,
and citizenship. Building on previous work in Playing the Identity Card:
Surveillance, Security and Identification in Global Perspective13 and my
Identifying Citizens: ID Cards as Surveillance,14 the fresh focus here is the
contrast between, on the one hand, the commonalities of global growth, the
new technologies (including software), and the political economies of new
IDs and, on the other, their local life. None of the common features of glob-
al growth determine how new IDs will develop and function in any specific
local context. The paradoxical globalization of a means of national identifi-
cation illustrates broader themes of the diffusion of new technologies and of
their varying reception and consequences in different cultural settings.
Such themes presage some changes of major import. During the
twentieth century, individual and collective security were managed in dif-
ferent ways. Today, at least two factors challenge this distinction. The dis-
tinction between internal and external security is breaking down as real and
imagined threats are viewed as both global and national. New IDs exempli-
fy the merger of internal and external security as they are expected to oper-
ate both within and beyond "national" boundaries. At the same time, risk
technologies are also altering. Whereas these technologies were once based
entirely on probabilistic calculation, so that what might happen could be
insured against in the present, now both individual and collective aspects
II See PLAYING THE IDENTITY CARD: SURVEILLANCE, SECURITY AND IDENTIFICATION IN
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Colin J. Bennett & David Lyon eds., 2008) [hereinafter PLAYING THE
IDENTITY CARD].
12 See LYON, supra note 1, at 118.
13 PLAYING THE IDENTITY CARD, supra note 11.
14 LYON, supra note 1.
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are in flux. Individuals are increasingly asked to take responsibility for their
own fate, while simultaneously socially-based security is dismantled or re-
duced to a "safety net" for those unable to insure themselves. But risk is
also morphing into uninsurable threats from shadowy forces, so precaution
and preparedness become the order of the day.
In this complex context, new IDs play many parts rather than just
one role. Because some IDs aspire to be national IDs, they cover not just
specific groups such as car drivers, but rather whole populations. This
breadth speaks to the theme of preparedness and precaution. Especially
since 9/11, having access to information "just in case" has been high on
American and other agendas. Although the U.S. Administration is not roll-
ing out new IDs as such, the "Real ID" plan and its successors are intended
to fulfill the same goals.' 5 Crime and intelligence databases may be linked
using IDs, whether "real" or not. At the same time, the use of statistical sur-
veillance methods by government departments means that some groups
more than others may be singled out as threatening or risky, such as recent
immigrants. Because some groups may score highly in terms of risk along
several axes, including economic independence, the chances of what Oscar
Gandy calls "cumulative disadvantage" are high. 16 Thus, new IDs address
several issues pertaining to today's outlook of multiple uncertainties and
represent significant security and surveillance technologies being used for
managing populations. These technologies include not only hardware and
software, but also statistical expertise. Little wonder that Louise Amoore
writes of "governing by identity."'17 Identification is crucial to surveillance,
which is quickly becoming a key means of governance.
II. THE PARADOX: NATIONAL IDS AND GLOBALIZATION
New ID card systems nicely highlight a basic paradox. They are
used primarily for "national" purposes, even if they are supposed to be inte-
roperable between some states, but their development and spread are simul-
taneously global. This is a global phenomenon that fosters national differ-
ence. New IDs offer a concrete case study in the debates over globalization
and the demise or persistence of the nation-state. And it is a case study that
illuminates several questions that surround surveillance today. If ID card
systems are meant to keep tabs on whole populations, will their promised
interoperability also allow for the emergence of a global surveillance sys-
15 See id. at 49.
16 OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., COMING TO TERMS WITH CHANCE: ENGAGING RATIONAL
DISCRIMINATION AND CUMULATIVE DISADVANTAGE (2009).
17 Louise Amoore, Governing by Identity, in PLAYING THE IDENTITY CARD, supra note 11,
at 21. In Identifying Citizens, I argue that this might be better rendered as "governing by
identification." LYON, supra note 1, at 90.
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tem? To what extent and in what ways do new IDs contribute to the quest
for local, national, and global security? What impacts do new IDs have on
citizenship and, for that matter, what impacts does citizenship have on new
IDs?
The paradox mentioned above begins to resolve as soon as the cha-
racter of contemporary globalization and of today's nation-states is ex-
plored. But this exploration involves a particular perspective on these mat-
ters. If globalization is seen as a kind of zero-sum game in which its spread
sounds the death-knell for nations, then surely enough the puzzle persists.
The view taken here is that while several very significant aspects of globali-
zation are indeed at play in the rapid diffusion of new IDs-I am thinking
especially of technological and commercial globalization-these aspects of
globalization do not diminish the resilience of the nation. In fact, one might
be tempted to argue that in some contexts the globalization of ID systems
helps to bolster both the fact of, and popular commitments to, the nation.
First, consider globalization. Both consumerism and communica-
tions are vital features and drivers of globalization,' 8 and both are also con-
nected with the securitizing of identity and the proliferation of IDs. 19 Con-
sumerism has helped prompt the perceived need for stable IDs-it is often
argued that they may curb identity theft-as has the computer-
communications revolution, now more usually thought of in terms of "new
media," through which a growing number of exchanges occur.20 But other
common features of globalization also speak to a need for universally ac-
ceptable tokens of identification. Think of militarization, military intelli-
gence, and mass migration, which prompt again the requirement of reliable
means of identification and economic interdependence. The last two, travel
and trade, connect the national with the international as well as being indis-
solubly connected in themselves. For instance, Europe and North America
seek to develop IDs that both facilitate the freely moving commercial traffic
of goods, while at the same time sorting carefully between different catego-
ries of persons who may wish to cross national borders. 2'
Generally, globalization may be thought of as an ongoing transfor-
mation of the spatial organization of social relations and transactions as they
become more stretched, intensive, immediate, and influential. The outcomes
of globalization are increased flows and networks of activity, interaction,
18 See, e.g., GLOBALIZATION THEORY: APPROACHES AND CONTROVERSIES (David Held &
Anthony McGrew eds., 2007) [hereinafter GLOBALIZATION THEORY]. See also DAVID LYON,
POSTMODERNITY 69 (2d ed. 1999).
19 NiKoLAS S. ROSE, POwERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT 242 (1999).
20 See Lucas D. Introna, Making Sense of ICT, New Media, and Ethics, in THE OxFORD
HANDBOOK OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES 314 (Robin Mansell et al.
eds., 2007).
21 See, e.g., ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, GLOBALIZATION: THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES (2004).
2010]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
and the exercise of power.22 Like any other concept in the social sciences,
globalization is contested by those who say that globalization has been
overplayed, whether as a description of social reality, a theory of social
change, or as a political project.23 In particular, for those who regard eco-
nomic relations as the prime movers of all social and political change, glo-
balization as it appeared to many in the 1990s was at most a temporary blip,
epiphenomenal to the underlying logics of capitalism.
24
The largest challenge to globalization appeared soon after 9/11 and
related closely to new IDs. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks on
America, there was indeed a downturn in global trade along with a palpable
shift in political priorities towards reasserted nationalism, a return to geo-
politics, a hardening of state power, and the closing of borders (whose
openness had so recently been celebrated by pro-globalization enthusiasts).
Understandably, given the style of U.S. leadership epitomized by George
W. Bush, American military might was also mobilized as a response to the
attacks and seen as a key element in the "war on terror." Each of these
priorities has a bearing on new IDs. Such IDs symbolize the significance of
the national, territorial, and state power and, of course, of borders and
boundaries.
Second, nationalism came to the fore with a vengeance following
9/11 and was expressed above all in prioritized notions of "national securi-
ty." During the twentieth century, in the West the term "security" referred
primarily to social security, but this shifted to national security after the
Second World War. As Lucia Zedner summarizes, "while social security
pursues the full and fair distribution of the basic necessities of human flou-
rishing, national security measures seek to protect the state and its territories
primarily by political and military means. 25 Social security is rooted in
social justice and care for individuals, while national security is concerned
with power politics that see protection of the state from external threats as
paramount. The September 11 attacks pushed national security into a prime
position, politically, and this in turn propelled a quest for new surveillance
technologies and techniques geared toward such protection. This includes,
in the requirement of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, presenting
"a passport or other approved documents that confirm identity and citizen-
ship when entering the United States.' 26
22 See GLOBALIZATION THEORY, supra note 18, at 4.
23 Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Overselling of Globalization, in GLOBALIZATION: WHAT'S NEW?.
228 (Michael M. Weinstein ed., 2005).
24 Justin Rosenberg, Globalization Theory: A Post Mortem, 42 INT'L POL. 2, 2-74 (2005).
See also PAUL HIRST & GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION IN QUESTION (2d ed. 1999).
25 ZEDNER, supra note 5, at 36.
26 Press Release, Datacard Group, British Columbia Uses Datacard Solution for New
Enhanced Driver's License Program (June 29, 2009), http://www.datacard.com/news/
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While new surveillance regimes depend in part on a revived empha-
sis on national security, it is also the case that the revived emphasis on na-
tional security depends on the existence of deep veins of nationalism, or at
least of commitments to the nation-state. However, just as some theorists
became skeptical about the significance of globalization, other theorists who
are committed to some version of globalization theory have doubted wheth-
er nations have any future in a world of globalizing trends. Historian Eric
Hobsbawm, for example, sees the cultural significance of both nationalism
and the nation shrinking as a result of a more global sense of identity,27 and
anthropologist Arjun Appadurai sees the nation-state in "serious crisis" as
globalization has "de-territorialized the nation., 28 Yet there seems to be
plenty of evidence, well beyond the understandable recourse to "the nation"
after 9/11, that nations, let alone nationalisms, are not on the wane.29 In-
deed, while the perceived security crises following 9/11 may have spurred
efforts at reinforcing national security and while technological corporations,
eager for new contracts, may be knocking on many "national" doors to offer
their wares, the "nations" under threat seem to be real enough entities.
The doyen of studies on nations and nationalism, Anthony D.
Smith, insists that while various layers of globalization definitely do make a
difference in the ways that nations are conceived and considered, nations
themselves persist for a number of compelling reasons. His is an "ethno-
symbolic" approach that shows how nations are "historical intersubjective
realities" based in a sense of the sacred, attached to social processes and
cultural resources.30 For Smith, various kinds of processes contribute to
nation-making: self-definition, myth and memory-making, territorialization,
public culture, and law-making.31 Smith's analysis refers primarily to the
Western world but some of his insights apply elsewhere. As he points out,
"hot" nationalisms in newer nations such as Latin America and Africa are
often associated with ethnic conflicts.32
Smith acknowledges the threats posed to an ongoing sense of na-
tional identity in each area but counters these helpfully with evidence that
that "sense" still persists. For instance, self-definition may be diluted by
newsreleases/news-content.jhtml?recordld=N9r9UrGJGWnnQi&contentld=NewsReleases
ByDate.
27 E. J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780, at 163 (1990).
28 Arjun Appadurai, Sovereignty Without Territoriality: Notes for a Postnational Geogra-
phy, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF IDENTITY 41-65 (Patricia Yaeger ed., 1996).
29 See, e.g., MICHAEL BILLIG, BANAL NATIONALISM 19-21 (1995).
30 Anthony D. Smith, Nations in Decline? The Erosion and Persistence of Modem Na-
tional Identities, in NATIONALISM IN A GLOBAL ERA: THE PERSISTENCE OF NATIONS 20 (Mit-
chell Young et al. eds., 2007).
31 See generally id.
32 Id. at 22, 28 (citing BILLIG, supra note 29).
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multiculturalism and the expansion of hybrid national identities,33 but even
in Canada a "national culture" is still apparently strong-and may well
pride itself, rightly or wrongly, on its capacity for tolerance. Again, with
respect to the intensifying of economic interdependence, this has not
seemed to produce a "deterritorialized" situation. To take the Canadian ex-
ample again, the fact that Canada has the world's "largest undefended bor-
der" does not mean that Canadians will defend not only cultural differences
that supposedly differentiate them from Americans, but also the integrity of
the "land" on the Canadian side of the border. As far as laws and customs
are concerned, it is true that governments have had a harder time maintain-
ing legitimacy and even credibility in recent decades. The increasing regula-
tion of everyday life may alienate the public, mass immigration may
weaken national consciousness, and the fear of absorption into broader
blocs such as the EU or the North American Free Trade Area may become a
reality.
But in each case, interestingly, new IDs relate. In the example al-
ready given, of Canada and the U.S., mass migration in both countries has
raised questions about national identity and about material expressions of
this identity in forms of ID. The Mexican "Matricula Consular" ID is now
used in the U.S.,3 4 and the Canadians developed a "Permanent Resident
Card," also known as the Maple Leaf Card, to issue to residents who are not
yet citizens.35 Crossing the increasingly defended border has become a con-
troversial and risky experience and new ID surrogates-"Enhanced Driver's
Licenses"--have been introduced as part of the attempt to shore up security,
in addition to other ID requirements at airports.36 As these are interoperable
systems, the sense of threatened incorporation of Canadians into a larger,
perhaps alien entity brings up the concept of national identity once again.
A. National IDs as Surveillance
Modes of national identification have always had surveillance pur-
poses. However, new IDs have surveillance capacities that are enhanced
significantly compared to earlier systems. The surveillance dimension is
seen above all in the national registry, upon which all such schemes neces-
sarily rely. This repository of names and related identification information
33 See generally Smith, supra note 30, at 23.
34 See Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee Leaders Urge Curbs on
Acceptance of Consular ID Cards (July 10, 2003), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
legacy/news0710.htm.
35 See Canadian Citizenship and Immigration, Permanent Residence Card, http://www.cic.
gc.ca/english/information/pr-card/index.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
36 See Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, Enhanced Driver's License, http://www.
getyouhome.gov/html/langeng/engedl.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
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has always been a significant power container (to use Anthony Giddens'
term for the state itself),3 7 and offers opportunities for fair and equal treat-
ment of all registered as well as the possibility of singling out certain groups
for differential treatment. Thus, new immigrants may be delighted to re-
ceive a national ID, symbolizing their inclusion in the adopted country.
Equally, the use of IDs may open doors to negative discrimination, such as
in Kenya where place of birth and tribal origin may jeopardize access to
credit or educational opportunities. 3
If surveillance is the gathering and storing of information in order to
supervise people's behavior, then registration and identification systems
qualify as methods of surveillance par excellence. In Foucaldian terms, it is
where biopower meets older forms of discipline. By statistical means, such
as the national census, or the citizen registry, tabs may be kept on the popu-
lation. These tabs actually serve to categorize the citizen in particular ways,
producing people as members of certain categories such as "taxpayers" or
"seniors." But when linked to an ID card, state officials or police may de-
mand that such cards be presented as a means of direct discipline. No card
means no benefit, privilege, or right.
From time to time such surveillance capacities are augmented by
technological means. The move towards electronic databases and biometric
verification is the latest and most far-reaching technological development.
Several innovations are made at once: greater speed of communication,
more connections between the system and the individual, enhanced ability
for authorities to pull data together into one place, and larger storage.39
These technological developments could be read as signs of an Orwellian
drift towards tyranny. James Rule first discussed these capacities as presag-
ing a "total surveillance" situation,40 but such technological capacities are
better thought of as part of a complex system, the outcomes of which are far
from clear. This lack of clarity has partly to do with the unknown results of
trying to manage very large-scale databases or to find optimum ways of
ensuring that biometrics really do function as promised by device manufac-
turers, but also with the outcomes of ongoing negotiations and conflicts
within which new ID systems are found.
In countries such as France that have had a universal ID card sys-
tem in place for several decades, upgrading bureaucratic techniques for reg-
37 See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF
STRUCTURATION 136 (1984).
38 Prevent Genocide International Group Classification on National ID Cards,
www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/removing-facilitatingfactors/lDcards/sources.htm.
39 See DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 51-52
(1994).
40 JAMES B. RULE, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE: SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE
COMPUTER AGE 348 (1974).
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istration and deployment has followed the logic of shifting government
priorities. Concerns such as law enforcement, social policy, and health poli-
cy have been evident in the past, while border control for international trav-
elers, new criteria for who is "dangerous," and a desire to outsource identi-
fication processes have characterized the development of new biometric IDs
in the early years of the twenty-first century.4' At the same time, the inter-
vention of several actors from the Conseil nationale de informatique et li-
bertes (CNIL), the French press, political parties, and trade unions have
raised serious questions about the viability and fairness of France's INES
(identitg nationale elctronique sdcurisde) program, and in 2007 brought it
to a grinding, if temporary, halt.42 In 2010 it has yet to be fully imple-
mented.
As a means of surveillance, IDs have huge importance. IDs not only
bring together biopower and more direct discipline, but they also act as a
hinge linking state with citizen. New means of identification are sought in
an era of information technology dependence and these means of identifica-
tion operate through a ripple effect with widening circles of influence. No-
tions of information management have come to dominate the managerial
state with its actuarial leanings and, within such management, accurate
identification is of the essence. Government departments seek new efficien-
cies, economies, and speed of response, for which the mantra of e-
Government has become a popular rallying cry. The potential benefits for
individuals of government efficiency and responsiveness are palpable. Who
would object if driver's licenses, hospital admissions, building permissions,
and unemployment benefits arrived in the correct mailboxes faster?
At the same time, the simple idea that ID surveillance connects state
and citizen deserves closer inspection. On the one hand, the nation-state is
not quite the singular entity suggested by that concept. Above all, and espe-
cially in a world suffused by information technologies, identification sys-
tems depend heavily on suppliers of software and hardware. These are com-
plete systems that include personnel, expertise, and know-how, as well as
integrated circuits, telecoms links, and plastic cards. The complex links be-
tween governments and corporations, which also involve actual technical
choices to which later generations are then locked-in,43 now mean that these
governments can do very little by way of national registration and identifi-
cation. ID systems are produced by a "card cartel" of interests, stakeholders,
and protocols. Where John Torpey rightly spoke of a "monopoly on the
41 See Pierre Piazza & Laurent Laniel, The INES Biometric Card and the Politics of Na-
tional Identity Assignment in France, in PLAYING THE IDENTrY CARD, supra note 11, at 199.
42 See LYON, supra note 1, at 149.
43 See KINGLSEY DENNS & JOHN URRY, AFTER THE CAR 54-59 (2009).
[Vol. 42:607
NATIONAL IDS IN A GLOBAL WORLD
means of movement" with respect to the passport, we now have to consider
the rise of the "oligopoly of the means of identification.
' 4
But if the state is a far from simple entity, then so is the citizen. I re-
fer back to earlier comments about the ways in which citizens are con-
structed through the means of identification. Whereas freedom was once
regulated within systems designed to include everyone who could lay claim
to citizenship and offer equal protection, and treat them the same as possible
before the law or in terms of their access to benefits and rights, increasingly
the onus is on individuals to take responsibility for themselves within a
range of possibilities. And while ID systems have always been based on the
exclusion of the outsider as well as the inclusion of insiders, the new em-
phasis on individual responsibility is significant. Citizens are sorted accord-
ing to certain criteria, and this process is facilitated by new IDs. Searchable
databases are best suited to classifying and profiling different population
groups so that they may be accorded different treatment. This may depend
on age, gender, residence, country of origin, or even religion (for instance,
the category "Jew" appeared on Bolivian IDs in 2008). 45
Although the categories may be fairly fixed, to do with supposed
ethnicity or religion, the ways in which citizen profiles are presented to
government departments also derive from ongoing, shifting criteria. And
here too the influence of private corporations in creating those profiles be-
comes evident. In the U.K., for example, risk-managed service delivery of
forms of identification such as driver's licenses means that applicants are
screened not only for obvious factors such as previous disqualification, but
also for their "trust score" discovered through their commercial transactions
46
as analyzed by Experian, a private data-management company. In this
layering process, higher scores are associated with customers' clearing bank
transactions than with others' dealings with mail-order companies, and only
if a specific score is reached can the applicant proceed to the next stage.47
B. National IDs and Security
One justification for new IDs is their claimed contribution to securi-
ty, by which-in the West-is meant to be national security. Although na-
tional ID systems are generally still very much in flux, where national secu-
44 David Lyon & Colin J. Bennett, Playing the ID Card: Understanding the Significance
of Identity Card Systems, in PLAYING THE IDENTITY CARD, supra note 11, at 11 (quoting JOHN
TORPEY, THE INVENTION OF THE PASSPORT: SURVEILLANCE, CITIZENSHIP AND THE STATE 1
(2000)).
45 See Martin Arostegui, Bolivia Raises Hackles with ID; Star of David Seen on Cards,
WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 10, 2008, at Al.
46 LYON, supra note 1, at 48.
47 See John Taylor et al., Information-Intensive Government and the Layering and Sorting
of Citizenship, 27 PUB. MONEY & MOMT. 161 (2007).
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rity is a stated policy goal, some kind of new ID system is being imple-
mented. The fully-fledged universal systems touted by politicians and en-
trepreneurs after 9/11 have in some cases-such as the U.K. and France-
run into serious problems. For instance, in the U.K. technological failure
and mismanagement have fueled public doubts, and in others, such as the
U.S. and Canada, fears of intensified state intervention and worries about
lost privacy have slowed or redirected ID policy efforts. But even where the
original aspirations for national IDs have shrunk, hopes of enhancing na-
tional security still offer strong incentives to adopt some means of biome-
tric-based identification.
As far as the War on Terror is concerned, national security is at a
premium. External threats abound and shoring up borders and entry-points
is a paramount task. While some of this enhanced border protection may be
achieved by means of fences, land-based and aerial video-surveillance, and
security patrols-as is the case on the Canadian and Mexican borders of the
U.S., for example-monitoring border crossings of goods and especially
persons is crucial. Hence the new paraphernalia of watchlists and no-fly
lists, intensified baggage checks and searches, visas, passports, and other
identification documents. One has to be identified at least once at all borders
and several times during transit in airports. In some European countries,
national IDs and trusted traveler cards may be used as alternative means of
verification to passports at the border, and in North America both enhanced
driver's licenses and trusted traveler cards work the same way.
Let me note in passing that the mention of Mexican national securi-
ty measures is not insignificant. While that country is a member of the Se-
curity and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), Mexican security
is not isomorphic with that of Canada and the U.S. In Mexico, the notion of
security conjures up visions of distressed and conflicted urban areas with
their gated communities set against the favelas of the dirt poor, ferocious
drug wars, organized crime, systematic femicides, and the like. Indeed the
disjuncture between American and Mexican views of security is considera-
ble. For instance, U.S. demands for Mexicans to use military personnel in
their internal security operations are unconstitutional according to Mexican
law.48
A contrast was previously made between early and contemporary
modes of identification, suggesting that now new weight is being placed on
IDs as a means of governance. In the name of security, today's ID schemes
go well beyond conventional registries of personal information, where past
records provide the main evidence, towards trying to incorporate what is as
yet unknown into the calculus. The idea is not just to verify identity, but
48 Nelson B. Arteaga, The Merida Initiative: Security-Surveillance Harmonization in Latin
America, 87 EuR. REV. LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN STuD. 103, 108 (2009).
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also to pre-empt particular outcomes and prevent certain risky bodies from
entering certain spaces.49 The apparent imperative at work here is that some
risks have themselves become unknowable, incalculable.
The controls on borders and airports are especially significant in
this context because they express a key feature of the post-9/11 security
climate: the mobility of international trade and travel are of utmost priority,
but they must also be made secure. This is best expressed in the title of the
SSP that emerged after 9/11 between Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. Al-
though the Report on the 9/11 Commission and the subsequent Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative mandated new ID schemes that are means of
pursuing these goals, 50 the SPP gives it a public face each time the leaders
of these three nations meet to discuss common aims and policies.
What is striking about what has actually occurred on these borders
and in the airports of North America are the ways that new or reinforced
security also has the effect of increasing insecurities. Louise Amoore shows
how the RFID chip in immigration documents may be used to locate already
existing personal data, which neatly connects security with mobility once
again.51 Indeed, where a potentially risky body may have been has become
an increasingly important factor in all border identification regimes. So, in
some high-profile cases in Canada, maps and ticketing information, among
other things, were used to subject to extraordinary rendition and torture sev-
eral citizens-Maher Arar, Ahmad El Maati, Abdullah Almalki and
Muayyed Nureddin-in 2002 and 2003.52
This brings me to note that the post 9/11 preoccupation with nation-
al security has frequently been at the expense of any consideration of human
security. While the focus is on national security, with its prioritizing of pro-
tection against external attack, attention seems to divert from other kinds of
security, notably those of freedom from want or from fear. With human
security, the focus is on the individual and her immediate concern with pro-
tecting families and livelihoods. The state of exception, as has been widely
discussed, has been normalized and a certain carelessness in handling per-
sonal data and the routine mistreatment of suspects has arisen. In the context
of national IDs, however, this issue is perhaps best addressed in terms of
citizenship.
49 See Amoore, supra note 17, at 24-27.
50 NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMIssION REPORT
393-403 (2004), available at http://www.9-1lcommission.gov/report/91IReport.pdf; see
U.S. Embassy, Consular Services Canada, Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI),
http://www.consular.canada.usembassy.gov/whti.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
51 Amoore, supra note 17, at 28-29.
52 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009); The Cases ofAlmalki, Nureddin and
El Maati, CBC NEWS, Oct. 22, 2008, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/arar/torture-
claims.html.
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C. National IDs and Citizenship
National IDs are offered to those who are citizens of a given state.
Even the more limited forms of biometric ID such as enhanced driver's li-
censes contain or connect with citizenship data.53 As we have seen, howev-
er, neither the notion of citizenship nor the concept of the state has the kind
of stability once imagined for them, at least in Western countries. National
citizenship is undoubtedly prized by some, but what is meant by that phrase
varies from place to place and is also undergoing historic transformations.
Citizenship that was once in the West a means of warding off the vagaries
of arbitrary rule and of holding governments accountable appears to have
such capacities attenuated, especially within states of exception following
9/11. Indeed, new border ID practices seem to many to foster a sense of
insecurity and arbitrariness, and opportunities to hold the government ac-
countable recede as secrecy and surveillance by policy rule rather than by
democratic debate become the order of the day.54
Let me make one or two further observations about new IDs and ci-
tizenship. First, although I argue that the screen and not the card, the data-
base and not the piece of plastic, is the key to understanding new IDs, the
card itself is not insignificant. Unlike booklet-style passports or single-fold
ID papers, the card follows the now common format for credit cards and
other commercial-use IDs as well as licenses and access cards such as for
health-care. In many Western countries, the citizen-consumer has been in
the ascendancy for some time, as neo-liberal restructuring has been en-
trenched. Consumer behavior is successfully eclipsing older forms of citi-
zenship, and this is symbolically expressed in the shape and feel of new IDs.
Some new IDs, such as the Malaysian MyKad, have built-in commercial
applications and others have been developed with such multiple uses in
mind, which again suggests a continuum of similar practices.5 Such IDs
typically offer access to places or privileges from which others will neces-
sarily be excluded.5 6 This in itself is a by-product of bureaucratic organiza-
tion, but what is all too often veiled in obscurity is the operative criteria.
Secondly, new IDs relate strongly to questions regarding citizen-
ship, such as who is included and excluded and why? New IDs are based on
a social sorting logic in which actuarial principles predominate. What makes
some bodies risky and others less so? Why does this person and not that one
obtain needed benefits? Responsibilization regimes that devolve what once
were public responsibilities onto individuals are in tension with the argu-
53 See LYON, supra note 1, at 6.
54 See generally TECHNOLOGIES OF INSECURITY: THE SURVEILLANCE OF EVERYDAY LIFE
(Katja Franko Aas et al. eds., 2008).
55 LYON, supra note 1, at 139.
56 id.
[Vol. 42:607
NATIONAL IDS IN A GLOBAL WORLD
ment that the test of good governance is through observing the care of the
weakest and most vulnerable members of a given nation-state, and it is the
former that guides new ID systems. Thus, these ID systems tend to maintain
existing marginalities and to reinforce cumulative disadvantage. They do
this, I argue,57 by having six features. They are (1) remote rather than face-
to-face; (2) interoperable and thus based on cognate categories internation-
ally; (3) categorical; (4) tending to conflate risky categories; (5) focused on
behavioral and bodily criteria, seen especially in the use of biometrics; and,
of course, (6) exclusionary. These new IDs represent what Didier Bigo calls
a banopticon that singles out exceptions as opposed to a panopticon that is
all-inclusive.58
Plainly, new IDs are key players in new modes of citizenship
emerging in many countries around the world in the twenty-first century.
These IDs reflect changing priorities and over time will become conduits for
directing practice in terms of those same priorities. But citizenship also has
an active dimension relating to political involvement and democratic direc-
tion. How may citizens who believe that such active dimensions are signifi-
cant respond and contribute to the rise of new IDs and to governance by
identification in general? Opportunities exist at several levels, from technic-
al, legal, and policy measures to awareness-raising, education, media, and
public protest.
One important banner that has been raised is inscribed with the
word "privacy." As a means of mobilization this can be effective in some
quarters and privacy advocates have a noble history of resistance to the
steady expansion of surveillance. 59 A focus on privacy may help to maintain
civil liberties and through Privacy Impact Assessments contribute to greater
care with personal data handling. At the same time it has to be said that pri-
vacy as a concept is a very limited weapon to wield against encroaching
surveillance by IDs. When ID regimes are used to govern pre-emptively or
to secure mobility, it makes little difference that some data are anonymized
or that trivial "private" data are maintained as such.60 Moreover, the screen-
ing enabled by data mining and record linkage goes far beyond the fixed
records and images of older ID technologies by building up complex and
constantly updated profiles. As Amoore says, "[i]t is not so much a lack of
privacy that is the political problematic, but rather a lack of social space in
"' Id. at 142-48.
58 See Didier Bigo, Detention of Foreigners, States of Exception, and the Social Practices
of Control of the Banopticon, in BORDERSCAPES: HIDDEN GEOGRAPHIES AND POLITICS AT
TERRITORY'S EDGE (Prem Kumar Rajaram & Carl Grundy-Warr eds., 2007).
59 See COLIN J. BENNEr, THE PRIVACY ADvOCATES: RESISTING THE SPREAD OF
SURVEILLANCE (2008).
60 Amoore, supra note 17, at 32.
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which we can see and be seen, engage with the differences and difficulties
of our world.'
As noted at the outset, new ID systems are in flux. There is a flurry
of activity on a number of fronts, driven by a variety of rationales, but it
remains unclear how or when these systems might stabilize. The paths taken
will depend, on the one hand, on government momentum, corporate deci-
sions, and technical choices, and the responses of ordinary citizens and of
concerned groups on the other. With regard to the latter, there are many
examples of critique, opposition, and constructive proposals regarding ID
schemes in several countries.
One significant factor is that much hangs on the public understand-
ing that databases, not cards, are the key issue. An international survey car-
ried out at Queen's University in Canada shows clearly that the more people
understand the nature of surveillance in general, the more they resist. 62 This
survey also gives some indication of how popular opinion plays out when
the implications of the national registry come into foCUS. 63 When asked
about the desirability of holding national IDs one finds a fair degree of cau-
tious assent, but when asked how far the same respondents believe govern-
ments would protect their personal information within departmental data-
bases and the national registry, there was a marked drop in confidence. 64 In
the eight countries surveyed, the proportion of agreement declined by about
half.6
III. CONCLUSION
Much political concern has coalesced around new ID systems, not
just in Western Europe and North America but also in Japan and else-
where. 66 This clearly indicates how NGOs, technical and academic coali-
tions, and civil liberties and privacy groups might yet make a difference
within some modes of active citizenship. The question of national IDs and
their surrogates is just one of several issues that concern new uses of per-
sonal information in the twenty-first century, but it is a crucial one if one
considers the opportunities and constraints on individual life-chances that
hang upon it. Like those other issues, unless serious attention is paid to the
ways in which personal data are so deeply consequential for life and liberty,
61 Id at 33.
62 David Lyon, National ID Card Systems and Social Sorting: International Public Opi-
nion, in SURVEILLANCE, PRIVACY, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION:




66 See, e.g., BENNETr, supra note 59, at 137-43.
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already marginalized and disadvantaged groups will continue to bear the
brunt of the negative impacts associated with access to such data. Days are
dark but, as I have explained, some cracks that admit light are evident.
